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So there need be no apprehension that the dialectic method will infringe upon the rights of the finite. We leave to Geometry its categories of the understanding, and to Michel his two *Groschen*—so long as he can keep them together—and admit that his reckoning must be based on these much-famed laws of logic. To the question whether Cæsar died on the Ides of March, 44 B. C., we certainly cannot answer Yes and No at the same time, nor can we say “neither Yes nor No”; the logicians are in the right here. This is either a shilling or else it is not a shilling; I have either paid my shoe-bill or I have not paid it; in all these cases the fundamental laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle must be appealed to. Only such logic should modestly keep within its sphere, and not try to deal with subjects not to be measured by its standards. It should not announce its finite categories and abstractions as though they were all-inclusive, and hence infinite and absolute.

MARTINEAU'S IDIOPSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS.¹

BY S. W. DYDE.

The subject-matter of this article is included under two heads: I, a statement in Mr. Martineau's own language of his ethical views; and II, a criticism of two of his fundamental conceptions—namely, his understanding of what is meant by a spring of action, and his view of volition. An estimate of his conception of volition must embrace some reference to his theory of conscience. Indirectly I aim to show that the difference between Utilitarian ethics on the one hand and on the other hand the ethics of intuition, as represented by Mr. Martineau's “Idiopsychological Ethics,” is not really radical, and that a possible reconciliation between these two conflicting theories is indicated now and then by Mr. Martineau himself. Although I dwell perforce upon the views of Mr. Martineau, with which I cannot completely agree, I do so in order to empha-

¹ “Types of Ethical Theory,” by James Martineau, D. D., LL. D., Principal of Manchester New College, London. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885. The theory discussed in this article covers pp. 1–279 of vol. ii. The references are to the first edition.

size those features of his theory which seem to me to point to better things. Indeed, it may be I only direct attention to another aspect of the basal principle of ethics, and try to show that this second aspect, united with the aspect rendered prominent by Mr. Martineau, makes the true foundation of moral science.

I. What is the essence of a psychological method? (1) It not only assumes reflective self-knowledge to be possible, but gives it precedence in ethical relations over other knowledge, and proceeds thence into the scene around ; and (2) it not only begins from the self-conscious man, as the better known, and treats the phenomena so found as genuine phenomena, but accepts also whatever these phenomena carry ; and if they imply in their very nature certain objective assumptions, these reports, as contained within the known phenomena, it trusts as knowledge ; in other words, it believes in the inner experiences not simply as appearances within us, but where they offer testimony as witnesses of realities without us. Both these positions require to be emphasized. An egoistic doctrine such as Fichte's Idealism misses the true ethical conditions, as it reduces moral obligation to a mere modification of Self. Without objective conditions the idea of *Duty* involves a contradiction. Conscience does not *frame* the law ; it simply *reveals* the law that holds us ; and to make everything of the *disclosure* and nothing of the *thing disclosed* is to affirm and to deny the revelation in the same breath. Further, our psychology must be dualistic in its results, recognizing, as in its doctrine of perception, so in its doctrine of conscience, a *Self* and an *other than self*. In perception it is *Self and Nature* ; in morals it is *Self and God*. Psychological *self*-knowledge is possible, for, as we are continually telling our own thoughts and feelings and purposes, is it not ridiculous to assert that we *can not know them* ? Moreover, of these phenomena of the mind there must be an inner mental order, legible to the same eye that deciphers the mental classes. We psychologically know more than ourselves, for the first function of intelligence is to construe not itself, but the scene in which it is placed. Yet subjective knowledge and objective are correlative. On the simple testimony of our perceptive faculty we believe in both the perceived object and the perceiving self. To the implicit beliefs secreted within our moral consciousness let precisely so much be conceded as we readily grant to the testimony of percep-

tion, and it will appear that, in learning ourselves, we discover also what is beyond and above ourselves.

The fundamental ethical fact is this: that we have an irresistible tendency to *approve and disapprove*, to pass judgments of right and wrong. *What is it* that we judge? Self-evidently it is *persons* and not *things*. The approbation or disapprobation which we feel toward human actions is directed upon them as *personal phenomena*. Consequently we always judge the *inner spring* of an act, as distinguished from its outward operation. For, whatever else may be implied in the fact that an act is a personal phenomenon, this at least is involved: that it is issued by the mind, and has its dynamic source there. Accepting James Mill's analysis of an act into (1) the sentiment whence it springs, (2) the muscular movement in which it visibly consists, and (3) the consequences in which it issues, if we cut off the first, then the other two lose all their moral quality, but, though we cut off the other two, the moral quality is wholly preserved in the first. The personal record contains a new act, if only the inner mandate has been issued, and the moment which completes the mental antecedents touches the character with a clearer purity or a fresh stain.

Whom do we first judge? Contrary to the verdict of the great majority of English moralists, the answer must be made that we judge ourselves first, and others only second. The inner spring of action is not apprehensible by external observation, but can be known in the first instance only by internal self-consciousness. This does not mean that a solitary human being could be possessed of moral estimates, for doubtless the presence of others is indispensable to the development of this part of our nature, not less than external physical objects are requisite to the unfolding of our perceptive power. Without material things around us we should not detect the Ego of Sense, nor, without human persons before us, the Ego of Conscience. But in perception the two discoveries—of *ourselves* and of our *objects*—are simultaneous, while in the moral case there is a difference which gives a clear preponderance to the subjective side. In perception the sensations of the self and the properties of the body are *heterogeneous*; it is otherwise when I learn my own moral or human affection in the mirror of a kindred nature.

But, to return to the inner spring of action, it is conceivable that we might be self-conscious of such a spring without ability to judge it. If it were a *mere spontaneity*, wholly occupying us and propelling us upon some activity, we might pronounce upon it no sentence of estimation, for a force, even a vital force, simply as such, is no moral object at all. Accordingly we never judge our *spontaneities*, but only our *volitions*. The spontaneous state differs from the voluntary, in this at least, that in the former a single impulse is present, but in the latter not less than two. The conditions of the former are fulfilled by any sort of inner propulsion from behind urging the living being forward on a track of which he has no foresight. Volition, on the other hand, implies *an end in view*, which cannot be contemplated except in relation to other ends in view. That there may be volition there must be comparison, and comparison is impossible without a plurality of impulses. Our mind could attach no attribute to a spring of action did we not see it side by side with something dissimilar, which is nothing else than *some other spring of action*. It needs to be observed that these impulses or springs of action must be simultaneous *inter se*, for, did they not present themselves together, the first to enter would have a clear stage and take effect at once; that it hangs fire is because another claimant tries to seize the match, and nothing can be done till some superior decides *which* piece has the best directed aim. It must also be observed that these impulses must be *possible to us*. We must not conceive ourselves to be the arena on which these incompatible phenomena of suggestion try their strength, but must feel conscious of being their master, and of having them at *our bar*. We evidently feel the solicitations which visit us to be mere *phenomena*, brought before a personality that is more than a phenomenon or than any string of phenomena—a free and judicial Ego. Moral judgment, then, postulates moral freedom; and by this we mean not the absence of foreign constraint, but the presence of personal power of preference in relation to the inner suggestions and springs of action that present their claims. The objects of moral judgment are, originally, our own inner principles of self-conscious action as freely preferred or excluded by our will.

In the discussion of the objects of moral judgment tacit reference has been made to the mode of moral judgment. The one

great condition which raises the spontaneous into the self-conscious life is the simultaneous presence and collision of the forces which check and exclude each other. Without the encounter of bodies, the dream of sensation would not wake into perception. Without the answering face of other men, the sense of personal existence would remain dim. And without the appearance in us of two incompatible impulses at once, or the interruption of one by the invasion of the other, the moral self-consciousness would sleep. It is not *difference only*; it is the *difference* which *amounts to strife* that completes the passage from spontaneity to self-consciousness. But the moment this condition is realized we are sensible of a contrast between the impulses which is other than that of mere intensity or of qualitative variety, and is expressed in the statement that one impulse is higher than the other. This apprehension is no mediate discovery of ours, of which we can give an account, but a revelation inseparable from the appearance of the principles side by side. It is in virtue of a sense of *Duty* or a feeling of *Moral Worth*, excited in us by the presence of these springs of action, that we are able to pronounce them higher and lower; and this sense or feeling is excited in us because the springs of action are possessed of the unique and unanalyzable quality of moral worth. When the cycle of original experience has completed itself, when all the natural springs of action have had their mutual play, there will be material for forming an entire ethical scale of principles. Owing to modifications in the constitution of the individual and to the maturing of society, this scale cannot be looked upon as finished, but it, so far as it is finished, coincides with the systematic code of Divine law. The whole ground of ethical procedure consists in this: that we are sensible of a *graduated scale of excellence* among our natural principles quite distinct from the order of their intensity and irrespective of the range of their external effects. The sensibility of the mind to the gradations of this scale—a sensibility which varies greatly in different individuals—is precisely what we call *Conscience*. The fact that different persons, as they have had different experiences and been surrounded by different circumstances, have had before them, in consequence, different sections of this moral scale, accounts for the fact that these persons differ in their moral estimates.

For the sake of greater clearness, moral judgment may be briefly contrasted with prudential. While the objects of *moral* preference are the *springs of action within us*, the objects of *prudential* judgment are the *effects of action upon us*. In the counsels of prudence is sought, not the affection it is good *to start from*, but the result it is pleasant *to tend to*; in other words, it is sentient good which in this case attracts the eye and directs the will. Prudence is therefore an affair of *foresight*; moral judgment, of *insight*. For want of experience we may *blunder*, but not *sin*. The man's *duty* consists in acting *from the right affection*, about which he is never left in doubt; it is his *wisdom* only that consists in *pursuing the right end*; and this perhaps grows none the less for the discipline of a few painful but guiltless errors. The *effects of action*, in the foresight of which Prudence consists, are of two kinds. First, there is the direct gratification of the impulse whence the action proceeds; and, secondly, there are the indirect and collateral consequences reflected back upon us from the world around on which the act is thrown, and where it sets new agencies at work. The first of these, being the direct fruit of our own nature, is constant and inevitable, repeating itself each time that the same spring of action has its way. Of what kind the gratification will be we do not know beforehand. It is the characteristic of impulse to drive us *blindly* forward on what it is commissioned to obtain; and the thirst that first sends us to the draught gives no prescience of the water's taste and feel. As the gratification is the more keen, the more intense is the impulse; Prudence is self-surrender to the strongest impulse, whereas Duty is self-surrender to the highest. But the advantage of yielding to a vehement impulse may be dearly purchased at the cost of the second class, of external and ulterior effects—the consequences entailed by the order of the world and the sentiments of mankind, including our own. These corrective consequences of precipitate action turn out to be no mere phenomena of our *natural history*, but creations, direct or indirect, of our *moral constitution*. These secondary results may, for example, consist in anguish or self-contempt, indignation of our fellow-men, or loss of fortune or health.

Where the order of strength among the springs of action is at variance with the order of their excellence, inclination will often stand in the way of duty. The vehemence of the temptation will

be proportioned to the extent of discrepancy between the two scales. As the force of temptation operates to relieve the shade of guilt, the life of widest visible aberration from a Divine standard of perfection is not necessarily the most wicked. The measure of our repugnance to low character is different from the measure of our moral condemnation; we recoil from it, as we should from any deformity, in proportion to its visible departure from our ideal of humanity; we condemn it in proportion as it has arisen in full sight of what is higher, and taken only paltry bribes from suborning interests or passions. Where the discrepancy is greatest between the moral and the prudential order of principles the guilt is least; and where the discrepancy is least the sin is greatest. But the two scales may agree. If, when this agreement takes place, the prudential order becomes paramount, the individual gives way more and more easily to the uppermost desire, till the autocracy of inclination becomes complete. When this occurs, the *human* element has disappeared, and there remains either *brute* or *devil*. When the moral order becomes paramount, a perfect harmony ensues in the end between the order of strength and the gradations of excellence. This is the true saints' rest and the ultimate reconciliation between our personality and God's. To God the *idea* of the sinful course of conduct cannot be denied without a limitation of His view of possibilities; but He freely prefers the right. Yet, since to him we cannot attribute conflict, it is possible for all conflict finally to cease for a human being likewise.

It may be well to consider here some inadequate interpretations of the simple feeling of authority. (1) Bentham denounces all appeals to a moral faculty as sheer "*ipse dixitism*"; but the fact that the feeling of authority is a constant characteristic of human nature tells against any such view. I cannot accept the inference that, because the authority first turns up in my own consciousness, it carries no weight but that of personal whim, for consciousness distinctly announces a law over me not of my own making. The power that creates law is adequate to alter law; yet we can pretend to no such prerogative with respect to the claims of the moral consciousness. It may, however, be contended that the authority which I feel is binding on myself, but that it must have no application in the estimate of others.

But no one who feels the authority at all can at the same time believe that it is an egoistic peculiarity. Mr. Sidgwick speaks of the "cognition of objective rightness as the cognition of a dictate of Reason." I would venture a little further than this "impersonal conception" and assert that the cognition of an authority *higher than we* means the cognition of a personal authority, for "higher than I" no "thing" assuredly—no mere phenomenon—can be. (2) Paley denies that conscience has any authority even over the individual, for the individual may set it at defiance. Paley would fall back on the proclamation of future punishment and reward. This view involves a contradiction, for Paley first supposes a man *to have a moral sense*, and then supposes him to put up with the stings of conscience as so much sentient uneasiness—a thing possible only on condition of his *having no moral sense*. The truth underlying Paley's view is that without the *award* of retributory happiness and suffering the authority of the moral law would be curtailed of its adequate supports. With our reflective knowledge of the better and the worse are connected secret auguries of joy and anguish, the failure and falsehood of which would throw discredit on the whole announcement of the inner oracle.

The nature of obligation may be looked at from two points of view—from the point of view of man's relation to God, and from the point of view of man's relation to man. God's claim upon us is not determined by His personal and absolute ideal, but by His communicated and relative ideal. But, inasmuch as the specks and films of many an unfaithfulness have injured our moral eyesight, our own image of right cannot be even that pure and full-proportioned vision which God had rendered possible. So we have a third or actual ideal, some removes from the communicated ideal. This fact at once takes away from man all ground of self-reliance in his dealings with God. But when, on the other hand, man deals with man, the measure of duty is *the mutually understood ideal*, which cannot in all cases be accurately determined. With regard to the claims of God, it is true that even the man who is strenuously conscientious cannot be said to have obtained a complete peace, but he may have entirely satisfied himself with regard to the claims of man. Moral authority extends over the prudential system, for we consider rashness

or recklessness as wrong, even though no interests are visibly affected but the offender's own. This result arises from the fact that this world is not a hedonist world, but a world in which the constitution of things includes a higher law and a divine rule.

As the fundamental principles of the theory have now been examined, there remains to be discussed the nature of the various springs of action. These impelling principles may be distinguished into two sets—the PRIMARY springs of action, which urge a man, in the way of unreflecting instinct, to appropriate objects or natural expression; and the SECONDARY, which supervene upon self-knowledge and experience, and in which the preconception is present of an end gratifying to some recognized feeling. These secondary feelings are not something entirely new, but the primary over again, metamorphosed by the operation of self-consciousness. The distinction between primary and secondary principles is based upon the fact that man is conscious before he is self-conscious, and has active tendencies in both stages. A portion of human action is due to instinctive impulses, putting us in the right way for natural but unexperienced ends. Man is distinguished from the lower animals, not by having a different mode of action throughout his whole nature and entire life, but by having a *self* with additional functions which act by laws of their own, and modify, during the maturer periods of his existence, the results of his instinctive powers. Instinctive impulse is that which spontaneously institutes means to an end not preconceived. The primary impulses may be divided into four classes, each of which, again, may be subdivided into three. Thus there are (1) the Propensions—namely, the organic appetites relative to food and sex, and Animal Spontaneity; (2) the Passions: Antipathy, Fear, and Anger; (3) the Affections: Parental, Social, and Compassionate; and (4) the Sentiments: Wonder, Admiration, and Reverence. Objection may be taken to placing the Sentiments among the primary springs, on the ground that we cannot admire or revere unless we distinguish ourselves from the object of admiration or reverence, and so must have a knowledge of ourselves. Chronologically, this is perfectly true; but, in the exercise of these sentiments, the Self which had been discovered is again lost; they carry us into self-forgetfulness, though they are posterior to our self-knowledge. The Propensions bear the char-

acter of subjective appetency. They are not unrelated to external objects, but require from them the minimum of importunity to move response. They carry us simply out of ourselves, we know not whither; the Passions repel from us our uncongenials, be they things or persons; the Affections draw us to our congenials, who can be only persons, unequal or equal; the Sentiments pass out by aspiration to what is higher than ourselves, whether recognized as personal or not. Thus the psychological order of the primary impulses may be based upon the nature of the object to which each is related.

But these twelve Primary principles play their part on the theatre of a self-conscious nature, and each of them, in the attainment of its end, yields us a distinct kind of satisfaction. These satisfactions may themselves become *ends*, a taste for realizing which will constitute new springs of action, added on to the former, variously mingling with them, often quite ascendent over them. These are the *Secondary* principles, characterized by their *interested* nature or invariable aim to produce certain *states of ourselves*. These Secondary principles are but *the self-conscious counterpart* of the primary. Thus, in arranging the Secondary principles, we may adopt in the main the method of classification made use of in connection with the primary impulses. We have, consequently, (1) Secondary Propensions: Love of Pleasure, Love of Money, Love of Power; (2) Secondary Passions: Malice, Vindictiveness, Suspiciousness; (3) Secondary Affection: Sentimentality; and (4) Secondary Sentiments: Self-culture, Æstheticism, Interest in Religion. In addition to the preceding simple springs of action there are several compound principles, such as Emulation, Love of Praise, etc. It is plain that Prudence is confined in its judicial function to the Secondary principles, while Conscience has a discriminating voice over the whole.

A consideration of the moral value of the principles of action, both primary and secondary, will result in the following table:

Lowest.

1. Secondary Passions: Censoriousness, Vindictiveness, Suspiciousness.
2. Secondary Organic Propensions: Love of Ease and Sensual Pleasure.

3. Primary Organic Propensions: Appetites.
4. Primary Animal Propension: Spontaneous Activity (unselective).
5. Love of Gain (reflective, derivative from appetite).
6. Secondary Affections (sentimental indulgence of sympathetic feelings).
7. Primary Passions: Antipathy, Fear, Resentment.
8. Causal Energy: Love of Power, or Ambition; Love of Liberty.
9. Secondary Sentiments: Love of Culture.
10. Primary Sentiments of Wonder and Admiration.
11. Primary Affections, Parental and Social, with (approximately) Generosity and Gratitude.
12. Primary Affection of Compassion.
13. Primary Sentiment of Reverence.

Highest.

In the moral scale the Secondary Passions, which constitute in us a truly diabolic element, are alone inadmissible. All others have a relative moral value; these only are bad without qualification. The lowest of the remaining—namely, the love of ease and pleasure—may present itself at a time when the field is fairly disengaged, and then it may have innocent way. But it must yield the palm to even the primary organic propensions, for it is surely meaner to eat for the palate's sake than to appease the simple hunger. The third primary propension, Vital Spontaneity, which is a paroxysm of unselecting movement, is lower than the Love of Gain. This in turn, implying a certain gravitation toward ease and pleasure, is lower than the Love of Power. Nothing is more difficult than to determine the controversy of the claims of the love of gain and the Primary Passions. As for Antipathy, it seems plain that we would look with aversion upon the man who, though having an intense horror of blood, entered upon the business of butcher; Fear, again, cannot be appraised without reference to the worth of the object feared, and so has no definite place in the moral scale; while, in the third place, we would think a boy who controlled his resentment for the sake of money had given way to the less noble impulse. Consequently the love of gain must, on the whole, occupy a place inferior to the primary

passions. In the next place, as true sympathy is spoiled by antipathy ; secondly, as it is guilty and degrading to drown legitimate fear in ghastly festivities ; thirdly, as it is impossible to do away with an injury because it is unpleasant to deal with it—the Secondary Affections also must give way before the primary passions. Still, where an injury is not a wrong, and springs from no malignity, the amiable temper rises above natural resentment. Finally, though energy is *per se* morally neutral, yet, as the Love of Power is the expression of a strong and capacious nature, which implies a prompt understanding and a versatile sympathy with men, it is consequently essentially active, and so superior to the passions, which are essentially passive. There are, however, abuses of the love of power, though, when it is duly subordinated, it has a legitimate sphere neither narrow nor ignoble. This may be seen more clearly if it be considered that the love of power is the essence of the Love of Liberty—a resistance of power *that is* in the name of power *that ought to be*. But as the liberal-minded man would rather *teach* his fellow men than *rule* them, the Love of Culture should be placed above the love of power. Since personality is beyond doubt the culminating fact of the world, crowning the universe and transcending it, the impulses which imply personality—viz., the Affections—must be supreme amongst the springs of action. As for the Sentiments of Wonder and Admiration, there seems no reason for assigning to either an authority superior to that of the other, though they may have different places relative to their value to mankind. With regard to the Primary Affections, it is clear that if I am a father I have no right to beggar my children for the sake of a friend ; so that attachment is lower than parental affection. As parental affection is limited in time, it must *during its season* be more imperative than Compassion ; but Compassion must, on the whole, be granted the higher place owing to its *keenness* and *universal scope*. The highest position is occupied by *Reverence toward goodness*, which, when adequately interpreted, proves to be identical with devotion to God.

A spring of action may be considered from the point of view either of its binding force or of its goodness. He who estimates springs of action from the point of view of their binding force may be said to be of that type of mind known as dry conscientious-

ness, the conclusions of which are governed by the catalogue of the external contents of life. But when two springs conflict, one is not simply right relatively to the other, but the right is also the dictate of perfect mind. To actualize a tendency, not merely because it is right, but rather because it is the expression of a perfect character, adds to the act a fresh glory and a new light—call it poetic, or call it Divine. Those who actualize an impulse because it is the dictate of perfect mind are they who realize the spring of Reverence. If it be objected that I have distributed the sentiment of reverence all along the gradations of worth, and yet retained it as one of the gradations, the reply is that a *feeling*—unlike a localized physical object—may be in two *psychological places* at once. In the incipient stage of ethical life I have assumed no more than the co-presence of two competing impulses with an unnamed feeling or simple consciousness that one is better than the other. Not till these cases and others like them have been repeated do they organize themselves into a *conscience*. Similarly, at first, when choice is made the preference of the better may be properly referred to the love of right or virtue. But this love of right is as yet only a simple feeling. Not until later do we become conscious of it, and so make it a conception which in turn may become the basis for a new feeling—viz., Reverence.

Besides these simple impulses there are various compound ones, whose moral nature depends upon the moral value of their elements. In the consideration of these I admit that it is not possible so plainly to keep on the line of intuition, for, as many of the composite incentives involve general conceptions, our first estimate of these incentives is subject to reflective correction in a way which is not observable with the simpler impulses. Yet there is a quasi-intuitive consciousness attending even the compound springs. Of these, one of the most familiar appears under the names of *Vanity*, *Love of Praise*, *Love of Fame* (or *Glory*). This incentive has a great latitude according as it is more or less qualified by social affection. It can scarcely be recognized as the same feeling in the æsthetic fop and the saintly recluse, but it readily discloses its place in its broadest forms. *Generosity*, again, is rather a certain intensity in the primary social affection—Attachment—than a new compound, yet, owing to its indefi-

niteness, it cannot be given an invariable moral value. *Gratitude* is a variety of *generosity*, or rather generosity made definite. The *Love of Justice*, or the *preference for worth*, is a higher figure of the original sense of right, and might be called the *enthusiasm of conscience for its own estimation of character*. Lastly, whoever commits a breach of *Veracity* has spoken against the nature of things and the course of the world. *Veracity*, therefore, wields the authority of *reverence* as well as of social affection. But it is not, as a consequence, *unconditionally* obligatory; for it is binding only toward those who are within the "common understanding." Outside this region plainly lie robbers, madmen, and armed enemies. But the permissible cases of resort to falsehood cannot be determined without careful attention to the canon of consequences. Though I feel an unutterable repugnance to telling a deliberate lie, I should probably act, at one of the crises demanding such, rather as I think than as I feel, without, however, being able to escape the secret wound of a long humiliation.

The moral scale exhibits the duty of the agent at each crisis. It requires to be further observed that the agent, who is aware of the worth of a spring of action, can, to some extent, determine whether it should or should not present itself; but his power depends upon his usually limited command of favoring circumstances and surroundings. An exact definition of Right and Wrong will consequently assume this form: *Every action is RIGHT which, in presence of a lower principle, follows a higher; every action is WRONG which, in presence of a higher principle, follows a lower.*

II. It is necessary at the outset to understand what Mr. Martineau means by a spring of action. A spring of action is firstly a personal phenomenon. Spinoza has remarked that toward a being supposed to be free, affection is far more intense than toward one under necessity. Commenting upon this remark, Mr. Martineau says that "a being supposed to be free" he would designate as a person. In this statement he implies that, as it was merely Spinoza's rigid determinism which caused him to make use of the phrase "supposed to be," free agency is, from the practical point of view, the essence of personality. Consequently a spring of action is a phenomenon of a free agent; in other words,

it is "issued by the mind, and has its dynamic source there." But, secondly, we might be aware of a spring of action without being able to assign to it any moral value. Such a spring would be simply an "inner propulsion from behind" urging the living being forward on a track of which he had no foresight. A living thing is blindly propelled whenever a spring of action, of whatever nature it may be, is present alone in the individual. This solitary spring is a mere spontaneity the nature of which does not require treatment in a work devoted to ethics. As an animal or a lunatic may be actuated by a mere spontaneity, such a spring of action is not necessarily a phenomenon of a free agent. Again, in contrast with the spontaneous state stands the volitional, in which there are always found two or more springs of action. As a volition consists in the choice of one spring of action and the rejection of the others, a spring of action cannot be a volition. While there could be no volition without a spring of action, there can be a spring of action without volition. Finally, any of the following terms may be applied to a single spring of action, namely: "impulse," "tendency," "incentive," "impelling principle," "inner propulsion," or "inner suggestion," in addition to which Mr. Martineau has on several occasions made use of the term "motive."

It is manifest that the above statements contain two very different accounts of a spring of action. While, on the one hand, as a personal phenomenon it must be the expression of a free agent, on the other hand, as a mere spontaneity common to man, with animals it need not be the expression of a free agent. Although these accounts appear to be flatly contradictory of each other, there is a sense in which each is true. It may be true, *e. g.*, that an animal is urged by a mere spontaneity in a direction unknown to itself—*i. e.*, an animal does not act as a free agent acts. It may be true, further, that man, even the mature man, is actuated at times by such a spontaneity. At the same time it is true that not until we have an act as the product of a free agent do we enter the field of ethical discussion. Until a free act is analyzed no content can be found for the fact that we approve or disapprove, nor can it be said that the causality has been "not with the springs of action, to do with us according to their dynamics, but with us to express by their just subordination the symmetry and energy of our will." Consequently, to obliterate the distinction

between a spring of action from the standpoint of a free agent and a spring of action from the standpoint of a mere animal is to make ethics a branch of physiology, and would be false to the "idiopsychological" point of view.

On the other hand, while these seemingly contradictory estimates of a spring of action may both be true, as viewed from the side of the history of the individual or the race, both cannot be correct descriptions of a spring of action for the self-conscious agent; for the spring of action for a self-conscious agent has its dynamic source in the agent's mind or will, and is therefore the free identification of himself with any possibility of an act. Notwithstanding this fact, Mr. Martineau, throughout his presentation of his own ethical views, considers a spring of action for a free agent to be at one time a mere spontaneity and at another time the outcome of free will, and by means of these opposing principles is able to conceal from himself the fact that his theory is not an organic union, but simply a combination of two opposite ethical positions. It will presently be seen that these contradictory accounts of a spring of action may be reconciled if they are taken to be descriptions of aspects of a single spring of action and not descriptions of different springs. But nowhere does Mr. Martineau effect that reconciliation. Afterward it will be pointed out that the dualism which he establishes between the theory of Conscience and the theory of Prudence, and again between Primary and Secondary springs of action, rests upon the conception that the above conflicting views of a spring of action are both ethically sound.

In the introduction to the second volume Mr. Martineau, speaking of the different faculties of man's nature, says that by them he does not mean any separate agents, though he is unavoidably led at times into language of personification, and so attributes to them "conflict," "strife," and "authority." This language, nevertheless, he applies not only to faculties but to springs of action also, as when, for example, he says that "two incompatible impulses appear in our consciousness and contest the field." But this current coin of the ordinary sermon needs to be rung on the counter of a purely ethical discussion. Manifestly, if the language of personification is not in the strictest sense accurate, it should not be used, and, further, if it continues to be used after it

is admitted to be unequal to its place, any confession of its incapacity must come from the lips and not from the heart. Consequently it is not a surprise to find that Mr. Martineau generalizes the figure contained in the terms "contest," "strife," etc., and permits himself to speak of the impulses as "forces," and of the "dynamics" of a spring of action. But it has been already noticed that for him each spring of action has its dynamic source in the mind of the agent. So that underneath this figurative language he is able to speak of will as the source of moral action, and again of the spring of action as the moral source. When he is thus able to transfer the essence of an act from the spring of action, as in indissoluble union with the mind to the spring of action as it is in itself, he can easily ignore the fact that the essence of an act of a free agent consists in the identification of himself with a preconceived end or, in Mr. Martineau's language, with a particular spring of action. As a result, he is led to consider as the act of a moral agent that occurrence in which a single impulse has undisputed right, and with which the agent has no more to do than to watch its progress as an interested spectator. Once more, therefore, it is evident that the above figurative language conceals the radical distinction between a spring of action as the identification of a free agent with a certain tendency and a spring of action as simply that tendency. If a man does not identify himself with a certain course of conduct, no movements made because of his muscular and nervous organization can be called moral acts. Nor are they made moral acts by the supposition that the individual has the capacity to observe their nature and register their effects.

The same oversight on the part of Mr. Martineau is found in a note at the foot of page 156, where he remarks that "the one condition under which felt action may take place without self-appropriation of it by the subject is where it is put forth by a solitary instinct running an unimpeded course." Here may be found two different conceptions of the nature of action depending on the two different conceptions of the nature of a spring of action. If a single impulse or a solitary instinct be called a spring of action, the changes in the individual, which are the result of the operation of the impulse, must be considered as acts, and the subject of the influences must be an agent. But, on the other hand, if the spring of action

receives its real content only when it is appropriated by the agent, then only that can be considered as a true act which includes an effort of will on the part of the agent. If the solitary instinct be a spring of action, we have the startling consequence that the so-called agent has nothing to do with its workings except that it has chosen him as the arena for its gymnastics. It is surely absurd to call that being an agent who has no part in the formation of the act. The difficulty is not met by the assertion that such a state of affairs is found only in the most rudimentary humanity. The trouble lies in the view that the physical or mental changes of these rudimentary human beings, however much or little these changes may be "felt," are acts in the same sense in which that is an act which consists in a free agent's appropriation of a possible course of conduct.

Thus Mr. Martineau, magnifying the fact that both animals and men have instincts, and partially ignoring the fact that for a free agent any act must be the identification of himself with such instinct, is able to transport into his ethical theory a view of a spring of action which could be true only of those beings not strictly entitled to the name of agents. So he states that the natures of men and animals proceed for some distance in company, and again that in man are found certain impulses which are truly instinctive and in no wise distinguished from the instincts of animals. It does not need to be repeated that, though this be granted, such instinctive portion of man's nature must fall outside of the province of ethics, unless we are to deny Mr. Martineau's proposition that the fundamental fact is that we approve and disapprove. We cannot approve a mere instinct in at all the same way as we approve the conduct of a free agent.

Although Mr. Martineau holds that a solitary instinct runs an unimpeded course in only the most rudimentary humanity, he has given what he believes to be fair examples of impulses which, when sole occupants, carry the person unreflectingly and unreluctantly to their end: a child, not above the seductions of the jam closet, finding himself alone in that too trying place, makes hurried inroads upon the sweetmeats within tempting reach; a passionate boy splits his unsuccessful peg-top; the thirsty traveller seizes instinctively and without thought the draught from the spring he has found at last. The first illustration condemns itself, for the words

“trying” and “tempting” can have no meaning except for one to whom are possible two courses of conduct. In the second case, if a boy is passionate he, to speak popularly, usually gives way to his temper, and so is capable of acting from habit. But “habit” is a term without signification from the point of view of a being affected by a solitary instinct. Such a being may frequently go through the same movements, but cannot be said really to act. A giving way to passion has no meaning if it excludes the operation of will. The third case gains some credit from the fact that when a man is thirsty he does not usually need to consider any reason to abstain from drinking. But it is surely likely that if two men found themselves at the spring at the same time, the first to reach the cup would pass it to the other before drinking himself. Yet such an ordinary act of courtesy is not the same with the uninterrupted course of a social instinct. A customary act cannot be intuitive, for it is implied in the meaning of custom that the act was originally done voluntarily and has been repeated voluntarily.

Mr. Martineau, following James Mill, divides an act into (1) the sentiments whence it springs, (2) the muscular movements in which it visibly consists, and (3) the consequences in which it issues. In this connection Mr. Martineau says of an act that the first stir of origination takes place in the agent's mind. This cannot mean simply that the initial step in action consists in the examination of a number of springs, because it is impossible to reflect on several springs of action without the adoption of any one of them. The first stir of origination must mean the actual adoption of a particular spring. If so, then no doubt such voluntary adoption has a moral quality, even though the act is never realized in the external world. But, on the other hand, if the sentiment whence an act springs be taken to mean simply any single spring of action or solitary instinct, then no process of examination will detect in it a moral quality, as there is nothing in it to show that it need be the expression of a personality. Nevertheless, in the subsequent expansion of his theory, Mr. Martineau makes the sentiment whence an act proceeds, which is here said to originate in the mind of the agent, equal in all respects to a spring of action which may be found full-grown as well in the mere animal as in man.

Let us then understand that there are two ways of looking at

incentives. We may consider an incentive on the one hand from the standpoint of its origin and history, and on the other hand from the point of view of its nature as found in a free agent, for it is plainly one matter to estimate the value of tendencies which are found either in all living things, including plants, or in all animals, or in all or many men, and totally another matter to estimate the value of a tendency as adopted and carried into act by a conscious agent. The difference between these two inquiries is as wide as the difference between biology or sociology and ethics. It is clear that there is no question of responsibility or duty, or right and wrong, or approval and disapproval in the fact that men and plants need food and water, any more than in the fact that material particles are attracted toward one another at a definite rate. The possibility of right and wrong is introduced only when between the movements, which constitute the entrance of the natural tendency, and the subsequent movements there has arisen before the agent a more or less clearly defined ideal into which is fitted the acceptance or the dismissal of the present possibility of an act. And it is only because of this ideal that these subsequent and, in a sense, consequent movements can be treated as component elements in an act. The use of the word "ideal" entails one other distinction. It is necessary to notice that the recognition of the nature of any tendency, as compared with other tendencies systematically united, is not of equal length and breadth with the adoption of that tendency. A creature may or may not exist, I do not know, to whom may come a tendency and in whom may be the capacity to estimate the tendency, without at the same time his being able freely either to accept or reject it. Such a creature would not be a plant or a normal human being. At any rate, ignoring this creature, we may safely say that in the life-size act of a rational being it is possible to distinguish between the intellectual investiture of the ideal and the determined realization of it. Therefore, between the entrance of a tendency and the identification of the agent with his ideal there is distinguishable an intermediate step—namely, the recognition of the tendency's character. It is not to our purpose to insist that the first of these three stages may actually exist independently of the others, or that the first and second may exist independently of the third. It is enough to maintain that the first

does not involve the second any more than it does the third, and that the fundamental problem of ethics is the explanation of that which incorporates all three—namely, the full-formed act of a conscious agent. That is to say, if ethics is to be limited to the investigation of right conduct, a radical separation must be made between a mere tendency, incentive, spontaneity, or spring of action, and an adopted spring of action or motive.

It is one of the decisive merits of Mr. Martineau's theory that he does recognize the difference between mere spontaneity and consciously adopted spontaneity. But, instead of relegating the mere spontaneities to pre-ethical or sub-ethical positions, he gives to them an inordinate prominence. Now it is palpable that what he calls a mere drift of nature, physical, mental, or moral, cannot as such claim valid recognition in a theory which must firstly and all through discuss the significance of conduct. Thus it is that he is unconsciously led to insert into the drift of nature all the characteristics of a complete motive. In the same breath he both makes the distinction between spontaneity and motive and does away with it; and it is this skilful right-about-face which enables him to make so hard and fast a distinction between primary and secondary springs of action.

As Mr. Martineau's view of primary and secondary impulses may be found in the detailed analysis which made the first portion of this article, there need now be given only the briefest summary. The primary springs of action are said to urge a man in the way of unreflecting instinct, the secondary to supervene upon self-knowledge and experience, and to imply a conception of an end gratifying to some recognized feeling. Further, the secondary feelings are characterized by their interested nature and invariable aim to produce *states of ourselves*. The distinction between these two sets of impelling principles is based upon the fact that man is conscious before he is self-conscious.

That the real distinction between primary and secondary impelling principles is not where Mr. Martineau is most inclined to place it may be understood by reference to his discussion of two of these principles—the need of food and the instinct of fear. First of all he describes the state of hunger as bearing in the highest degree the character of subjective appetency and mere drift of nature, and therefore as found in plants as well as ani-

mals.¹ Evidently the occurrence of such a tendency cannot imply a knowledge of its nature. But again he considers this mere drift of nature to be identical with a desire for food. He says that a hungry child should beware of fancying that it *wants* because it *likes*;² and thus he properly distinguishes between the desire to satisfy hunger and the desire for the pleasures of taste. Yet the want or desire to satisfy hunger is here considered to be the mere bodily condition or, in Mr. Martineau's own language, the primary propension with reference to food. But if the mere appetency is equivalent to a desire for food, then of course the occurrence of the appetency implies not only a knowledge of its nature and a knowledge of its having reference to food, but also a knowledge of one's self as distinct from the tendency and a conscious appropriation of that tendency. In that case it is impossible that it should be common to man, animals, and plants. Thus Mr. Martineau, when treating of the primary springs of action, looks upon the incentive of hunger as a mere tendency of man as physical, and when treating of the opposition between primary and secondary springs of action, looks upon it as a full-formed desire; and this desire has been shown to imply a knowledge of the nature of the objects in which the tendency finds its natural fulfilment. He therefore makes the objective aspect of a motive equivalent to a motive in its concrete completeness.

If we turn now to the primary impulse of fear, we shall find it first of all declared by Mr. Martineau that instinctive fear obviously goes before any experimental knowledge of harmful or disagreeable things. Immediately afterward it is declared that this instinct is, in its rudimentary stage, "a truly prophetic premonition of danger not clearly in view." This means that he who fears may not know the exact nature of the danger, but is aware at least that there is danger; so Mr. Martineau maintains³ that fear as a true instinct "arises from some real evil apparently impending." Further, a landsman is said to have this instinct who has the kind of dread of the sea that prevails in some tribes;⁴ so that the instinct is here made to embrace within it a knowledge that the sea is a place of danger. While, again, when in a plague-tainted city panic-stricken men and women herd together to drive

¹ P. 130.² P. 180.³ P. 183.⁴ P. 184.

away terror by drunken carousal and ribald song, not only is the true instinct of fear made in this instance to involve a knowledge of its nature, knowledge of the danger of a plague, and knowledge of the objects to actualize which will affect the removal of the fear, but is also made identical with a desire to effect that removal through carousal and song. Quite generally, therefore, such fear is considered by Mr. Martineau to be identical with a desire for its removal, and a knowledge of the means to effect that removal. Thus the instinct, which is at first said to be in all respects the same in animals and man, is finally placed on the same level with its appropriation by the individual or a desire for self-protection. Once more, then, along with an instinct taken to be a mere spontaneity, propelling the individual along an unknown path, is introduced a knowledge of its nature, a knowledge which can come only from the forewarning of others, or his own experience of its actualization. And once more the blind instinct is said to be at par with an open-eyed desire.

Mr. Martineau has said that his distinction between primary and secondary springs of action rests upon the fact that "man is conscious before he is self-conscious, and has active tendencies in both stages." The question turns upon the significance in the above quotation of the word "man." If it is meant by "man" that which is at one time only potentially existent and then successively an embryo, an infant, a youth, and a mature man, Mr. Martineau is undoubtedly correct. An examination into these different states might result in a history of the most highly organized mammal; a discussion of its physical and mental states would be but a portion of that history, and would comprise the physiology and psychology of the mammal. Further, an interesting object of inquiry would be the connection between these physical and mental states. The result of the examination would be summed up in a classification of the relations between internal and external conditions. As both sets of conditions are continually changing, though changing most markedly at particular times, different tables of relations would need to be drawn up for different periods. There would require to be a table of embryonic principles and tendencies, of the principles of infancy, youth, and manhood. The whole work would be composed of observed facts and deductions from these facts, and would differ funda-

mentally from no other special science. But such a work would have little or nothing to do with the province of ethics, for ethics is based not upon the history of the individual but upon self-consciousness. The foundation stone of ethics is the fact of the self as acting—that is, as freely willing certain ends, or, in a word, the fact of motive. Now, Mr. Martineau confuses between these two very different points of view the psychological and the ethical. At one moment he occupies the point of view of a scientific observer, and is engaged in chronicling what he believes, and probably rightly believes, to be scientific facts—*e. g.*, that man is conscious before he is self-conscious; at another time he is examining into the nature of man as possessed of purpose. While, therefore, the statement that man is conscious before he is self-conscious is in one aspect true, it is not true of man as a self-conscious agent, and so not true from the standpoint of ethics. Consequently the distinction between primary and secondary springs of action is one which falls outside of and not within the sphere of moral science.

But Mr. Martineau has something else to say regarding these two sets of impelling principles. After having made the unqualified statement that the differences between primary and secondary tendencies were based upon the fact that man is conscious before he is self-conscious, he has no hesitation in saying that the primary equally with the secondary impulses have to do with self-consciousness, and that the only real difference between them is a difference merely in the extent of our knowledge or experience in each case. He says: "The self-consciousness which distinguishes the secondary springs of action is limited to the knowledge of what they do to us, of what experience they bring in their train. I am far from saying that it is reserved for them to give us the first idea of a Self. To *this*, I conceive, the Primaries are competent so soon as ever a plurality of them compete for our activity; *then* we cannot but be aware of them as objects, and of ourselves as subjects, of more or less attentive thought; only, what we know about them is their immediate relative intensity and relative worth, and not their future sensible effects, if indulged."¹ In this statement Mr. Martineau has admitted too much and too

¹ P. 156, note.

little, for a knowledge of the intensity and moral value of a spring of action can mean nothing but the conception which the individual has of the results of its actualization. If a man knows he is being driven by the impulse of love, he knows he is being driven toward a beloved object. If he knows he is being driven by the desire for food, he surely knows that food will satisfy his hunger. In fine, if Mr. Martineau admits sufficient experience to distinguish tendencies, he also tacitly admits an experience of their complementary objects. Of course it is true that the individual's conception of the consequences of an act does not coincide wholly with the real consequences, for the actual consequences are infinite. Even after frequently experiencing what a tendency does with him, his knowledge of the consequences is far from complete. Yet he has obtained a clear conception of the leading and pertinent consequences in contrast with the numerous consequences of inferior moment, and it is just that conception which Mr. Martineau incloses within the knowledge of any particular tendency. So his absolute contrast between the two sets of impulses has sunk into a contrast between greater and less experience. It is clear that this difference, although it may be valid, is too slight a basis on which to build two distinct kinds of impulses. Any table of impulses applicable for one time would fail of valid application at another time.

We have quoted one sentence of Mr. Martineau's to which we would like to refer again. In comparing primary with secondary springs of action he said that what we know about primary springs of action is their relative intensity and relative worth, but not their future sensible effects. This comparison implies that it is possible for an agent to know the "intensity" and "worth" of a certain spring of action without knowing also the results of his adoption of it. No allusion is made to a single spontaneity, for, as we have seen, the characteristics of a mere spontaneity is that it carries the living being along a track of which he has no foresight. This limitation Mr. Martineau would himself make, as he affirms that no knowledge of the intensity or moral worth of a spring of action can be gained unless two springs compete for our activity. He has further said that we reach the ethical region not when considering spontaneities, but only when considering volitions. If, then, we are to count as ethically relevant the dis-

cussion of the difference between primary and secondary springs of action, we must plainly treat of them as of motives or volitions, not as of mere tendencies. And, as a matter of fact, Mr. Martineau, throughout his analysis of the moral value of the principles of action, has looked upon them as embodiments of the agent's will. This is manifest from his account of the appetite of hunger and the instinct of fear—two principles whose treatment by Mr. Martineau we selected for examination. Thus a primary spring of action must be the adoption by the agent of a certain natural tendency. Now, there are, says Mr. Martineau, two main features of motive or volition—namely, that it involves the simultaneous presence of two mere impulses, and that it implies an end in view. The first of these, asserting the necessity in volition for a mental combat between two impulses, we shall return to soon. Our question as to the relation between the character of the impulse and the nature of its “future sensible effects” has to do with the second—namely, that volition is essentially purposive.

What is meant by an act being purposive or an agent's having an end in view? This, at least, is involved, that the agent conceives beforehand of consequences which seem to him necessarily to follow from his intended act, and conceives of them as good. The end in view is the attainment of a state of things looked upon as desirable, in contrast with another possible, though less desirable, or even undesirable, state of things. The words of the foregoing statement are chosen because of their generality, as I am anxious that no cross-scent should prevent our keeping before ourselves only one thing at a time. This one thing is that the phrase “an end in view” becomes meaningless if deprived of all reference to conceived consequences of an act. It is doubtless true that the agent may be mistaken in his view of the consequences through a more or less remediable ignorance. It is also true that, since consequences ramify from the initial consequence, as branches of a tree ramify from the stem, and twigs from the branches, he could not be aware of all the consequences of an act. Yet there are consequences which may be called leading or definitive—those, for instance, which move amongst conscious beings, rather than those which affect material things. These essential results of volition come in time to be regarded as really involved in the nature of the mere tendency of the individual. And Mr. Martineau, when

he speaks of actualizing a tendency, though he believes himself to be shutting the doors against all possible results, has unconsciously given welcome to all the results which have any reasonable claim to kinship with the tendency.

Gradually, therefore, Mr. Martineau has been passing, though perhaps not quite consciously, from a rigid and narrow to a fluent and broad estimate of a motive or true spring of action. If springs of action are mere natural tendencies, the language of moral science is alien to them. If the being who is the subject of these tendencies has a knowledge of their nature, he knows also what will be the result if the tendency makes its way across or through its sphere of existence. When the tendencies are said to compete, conflict, or strive with one another, it is meant that the being, who is their arena, is no longer merely conscious of them, but is an agent who decides upon the tendency which he shall adopt. If the agent in acting voluntarily is admittedly striving to attain a preconceived end, then free identification with a tendency coincides with the desire to bring to pass certain results.

All these inferences come naturally from one aspect of Mr. Martineau's theory, and they lead inevitably toward establishing a harmony between intuitionist and utilitarian ethics. It would therefore be almost a surprise to the reader, who was not already familiar with the explicit statements contained in the "Types of Ethical Theory," to discover the depth of the dualism made by Mr. Martineau between his theory of morals and the view called by him the theory of prudence. The objects of moral preference are, in his own words, the springs of action within us, and moral preference is opposed to prudential judgment whose objects are the effects of action upon us. In the counsels of prudence are sought not the affection it is good to start from, but the result it is pleasant to tend to. The man's duty consists in his acting from the right affection about which he is never left in doubt; it is his wisdom only that consists in pursuing the right end. The gulf fixed by Mr. Martineau between these two views cannot be better bridged than by showing what is involved in the higher elements of his own theory.

Our attention has hitherto been directed to the fact that volition implies an end in view; but now we turn for a moment to what Mr. Martineau thinks to be the main feature of volition—namely,

that it involves the competition of two hostile impulses. Already the observation has been made that, if the impulses are mere spontaneities, ethics can have nothing to do with them, whether they are disposed to be friends or enemies of each other. Indeed, it must be admitted that there is no cause why impulses should compete rather than enter into partnership. But setting aside the fact that the idea underlying the term "competition" or "strife" is one which fails of application in ethics, we must raise a second objection, just as fatal as the first, to the view that an act is reached only after two tendencies have had a conflict. This objection is that even though the word "conflict" be denuded of its metaphorical dress and be taken to mean only that an act is in some sense a choice, yet the full signification of motive is not gained unless it be remembered that the agent before acting reckons how the contemplated act is to affect his life. Whether the agent decides to adopt or not to adopt a certain tendency, he decides because the adoption of the tendency is or is not in keeping with what he conceives to be for him the best life. No tendency is rejected or received in naked isolation. It is taken up and set into a more or less clearly defined scheme. If it fits well with this scheme, it is welcomed; if it does not fit with the scheme, it is set aside. More is implied in an act than any comparison of alternatives. In every act is to be found a more or less clear conception of what is meant by a good life. Consequently we do not reach the last essential of motive if we describe tendencies as necessarily conflicting. Every tendency has its place lowly or lofty in the agent's scheme.

This criticism, again, is only a turning of Mr. Martineau's artillery upon his own ranks. He, however, gets beyond the competition of impulses by supposing that, when two springs of action strive, there always arises a third—namely, the incentive of reverence. This incentive of reverence is in his hands made to comprehend the form of a graduated scale of impulses or the articulated conception of a complete life. This view contains nearly all that is wanted in any system of moral science, but it is not given its due dignity by Mr. Martineau. If the incentive of reverence were, as he thinks it to be, only another spring of action, the competition of springs would merely assume larger proportions. He asserts that the spring of reverence is unlike any other incentive

in this, that reverence occupies two psychological places, while all others must be satisfied with one place. Reverence has a unique place as the crowning impulse of human nature, while also it appears in the background when any two springs of action "contest the field." The statement that reverence can occupy two psychological places is almost calculated to provoke a smile. If Mr. Martineau would but severely analyze what his ethical breadth has enabled him to admit, he would see that the truth underlying the omnipresence of reverence does away with the view that strife of springs of action is a cardinal point in a theory of moral worth. First of all, tendencies cannot conflict; secondly, if they could conflict, they would not in that way reveal their nature. It is only when impulses are, in Mrs. Browning's fine words, "driven past themselves" and given their place in a conscious purpose or ideal, that their value is disclosed.

Perhaps it may not be quite useless to refer briefly to a view to which Mr. Martineau, in spite of the higher elements of his theory, has lent his sanction—namely, the intuitionist's conception of conscience. So soon, we have already been apprised, as two incompatible impulses appear in our consciousness and contest the field, we are sensible of the fact that one is higher or worthier than the other. This fact is no mediate discovery of ours, of which we can give an account, but a revelation inseparable from the appearance of the impulses side by side. The sensibility of the mind to the gradations of the moral scale is Conscience. Conscience, the Introduction says,¹ does not frame, but simply reveals the law; it is the critical perception of the relative authority of the principles of action.² This authority is none other than a simple feeling, admitting of little analysis or explanation.³

It is perhaps only a verbal criticism that, if authority is a simple "unanalyzable feeling," and conscience is the sensibility of the mind to such feeling, conscience is a feeling of a feeling. Conscience would thus be subjective with a vengeance. But Mr. Martineau does not mean that authority is a mere feeling, but that the sense of authority or conscience is a mere feeling. Now as, according to him, every one has been more or less unfaithful to his ideal, so every one must have a conscience more or less perverted. The result is that every one will have a feeling, more or less

¹ P. 4.² P. 50.³ P. 92.

different from the feelings of others, upon every question of right and wrong. Manifestly no person's simple feeling can be considered as yielding a standard of action for any other person, for in that case every one would have as many standards as there were different feelings. The standards would be as numerous as the individuals, which is absurd. Any other man's conception of right and wrong must be as important to the individual as his own. The only rule would be, in the words of bibulous King Stephano, "Every man shift for all the rest, and let no man take care for himself, for all is but fortune." Not only so, but, as each person is subject to fluctuations in feeling, he would have, though limited to himself, as many standards of action as changes in his sensitive nature; and this is equally absurd.

But in another place ¹ Mr. Martineau, not satisfied with calling conscience a mere feeling, gives it a judicial function, which enables it to pronounce upon the moral value of every spring of action, primary or secondary. Yet, even so, the subjective nature of conscience is admitted by him in the explanation ² of how it happens that men, though of uniform moral nature, do actually differ in their moral judgments. The explanation of this intuitional anomaly is that different individuals have different natures, and have had different experiences, and so have before them a different section of the scale of inner principles. Further, Mr. Martineau affirms that had we all the same segment of the series under our cognizance, we would be everywhere and always unanimous in our moral estimates. But this assertion means simply that if men were identical in all their inherited tendencies—physical, mental, and moral, and also in all their circumstances—they would decide alike upon moral questions. In other words, if men were all the same, there would be no differences. Yet, inasmuch as there must be wide hereditary differences, and wide differences in circumstances, differences in the verdicts on the question of right and wrong are necessary. In that case it is inevitable that one man may think to be right what another may think to be wrong. The Indian, *e. g.*, held revenge to be a duty. We read in the annals of the ancient Hebrews of the avenger of blood. Green, in his "A Short History of the English People," writes of the social life of the early Englishmen that "Justice had to spring from each man's personal action ;

¹ P. 173.² P. 56.

and every freeman was his own avenger." On the confines of civilization there still prevails the custom of lynch-law. If each man's conscience reveals the law, then the Indian, the early Hebrew or Englishman, and the rough-and-ready pioneer must be as transparent mediums for the divine light as the most pious saint or profound moral philosopher. It is palpably beside the mark to urge that the Indian is not as capable of judging as is the cultured European, for that would be giving to the revelation of the man of culture a privilege denied to the revelation of the man of the woods. To make that statement would be the same as saying that the Indian's conscience did not reveal the true law; and this would be contrary to the assumption of the intuitionist that each man judges infallibly concerning right and wrong. The fence is not overleaped by the declaration that the Indian's conscience must be his judge while the white man's conscience must be *his* judge, for that is equivalent to the assertion that no universal moral law is possible. It is the admission of inherent weakness to reply that these men would announce the same law had they been in the same circumstances, for that can mean only that a moral law is the height of absurdity. It is a mere subterfuge to hold, as some moralists have held, that all differences and mistakes must be laid at the door of judgment and not of conscience. That theory saves conscience by cutting off its head. If judgment decides what is right and what is wrong, it must, in deciding, reveal the decision; if conscience is still thought to reveal the decision, it only feebly seconds what has been done by judgment. One may well exclaim with Socrates in the "Euthydemus": "Why, here is iteration." If it be objected that the difference between the savage and the civilized man is only a difference of less and greater experience, then once more conscience is limited in its judicial function to that which has already been judged. And again the duty of judging is in every point twice done, and then done double. The only reply which Mr. Martineau has made to the above is that "no man who feels the authority at all can at the same time believe that it is an egoistic peculiarity."¹ This simply means that no man can believe in a bald and logical intuitionism.

Perhaps another reply is intended in the following statement: "In the incipient stage of the ethical life I have assumed no more

¹ P. 95.

than the co-presence of some two competing impulses, with a simple consciousness of one as better than the other; and not till these cases, repeated with variation of the terms compared, gather together fresh judgments in adequate number, do they organize themselves into a *conscience*, able to reflect upon moral relations as a system under the one idea of obligation or right.”¹ If by this is meant that the wider is our moral experience the more complete is the supervision of conscience, conscience must be considered as waiting upon experience. But if Mr. Martineau means that the “simple consciousness” of one spring of action as better than the other is not a verdict of conscience, since conscience is as yet non-existent, then he gets rid of the difficulty by an absolute denial of his theory. If this “simple consciousness” is not conscience, it is possible at one and the same time to know the morally higher and lower, and yet to be without a conscience; and that means that conscience does not reveal the distinction between the more and less worthy spring of action. If it is meant that a free agent is capable, before any experience whatever, of deciding upon the right course of conduct, it is not conceivable, for, as a free agent must, in acting, have an end in view, he must likewise be conscious of the results of his act. This is the solution of the difficulty. The mystery which pervades the intuitional doctrine of conscience is explained away when a knowledge of the more or less worthy incentive is seen to be a knowledge of the better or worse results which accrue upon the actualization of the incentive. And this more excellent way also may be traced in Mr. Martineau’s ethical views.

We have been taking a long journey. Yet we are only now at the open door of ethics. Almost wholly unanswered is the question “What is implied in an end in view?” We have said that it implies a knowledge of results. But when the end is gained, is all gained? Or are other acts to be done? What is a true end? What is a systematized ideal? Or, as those of old times would have asked, what is the good? It may be ill-advised in a critic to confess ignorance of anything, yet I ought to confess that to that question I cannot give an answer such as I would like to be able to give. Even an inadequate answer would carry us beyond the limits of this review.

¹ P. 211.